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The dollar’s fall from 2001 through 2008 was steep, sustained, well-publicized, and, in
terms of “fundamentals”-based models, inexplicable.  Even if one argues, as C. Fred Bergsten did
before Congress in 2008, that this merely represents a correction to levels experienced in earlier
decades, it begs the question of why such massive swings occurred in the interim (Bergsten
2008).  Neoclassical economics leaves us with the less-than-comforting observation that
“exchange rates appear to be influenced by forces so far unknown” (Gehrig and Menkhoff 2005,
p.522).
The problem, however, is not the enigmatic nature of currency prices, but the models used
to explain them.  In Neoclassicism, physics is seen as the ideal metaphor and thus economies are
imagined to be driven by rational, deterministic forces in a world populated by atomistic
individuals.  But markets are social institutions...
...like democracy and marriage...They serve to organize and guide human behavior
through sanctions (formal and informal, negative and positive), mores, norms,
status, and shared worldviews. Activities of markets are the activities of people
and societies (Harvey 1993a, p.679).
The lesson here is that if we are having difficulty explaining exchange rates, then perhaps the
answer lies in trying to understand the currency market as a cultural phenomenon and not a
physical one.  Our focus should be on the people involved and the subculture of which they are
members.
To that end, the goal of this paper is the specification of currency market participants’
mental model, or their internal representation of the workings of the real world.
1  This is what
they use to define, understand, interpret, and interact with “reality.”  It tells them what to expect2
when given events occur, it determines for them what is and is not worth monitoring, and it
suggests what actions they should take in various circumstances.  While, strictly speaking, the
mental model exists solely in the minds of those being studied, it is nevertheless social in nature. 
Market participants do not invent it in isolation, but as they seek each other’s advice, publish and
read scholarly and professional opinions, experiment with new approaches, train neophytes,
enforce formal and informal sanctions, interact with colleagues professionally and socially, et
cetera.  If we can understand what currency market participants think they are doing, then–since
they are the ones who actually set the currency prices–we can understand what moves foreign
exchange rates.
The paper will proceed as follows.  In the next section, the basic structure of the mental
model is outlined.  Following that, facts regarding its operation are offered.  The mental model is
then used to explain the dollar’s collapse between July 2001 and March 2008 and from that
exercise lessons are drawn.  Conclusions, including policy, follow. 
The Mental Model: Basic Structure
The market for foreign currency is dominated by portfolio capital flows.   The 2004 Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) survey indicated that the average daily value of currency
transactions (based on April of that year) was, net of double counting, around $1.9 trillion (BIS
2005: 1).  This was sufficient to finance world trade over 40 times (BIS 2005: 1; World Trade
Organization 2005: 3).  Imports, exports, and direct foreign investment obviously have an impact
on the price of currency as foreign exchange is purchased when those activities are undertaken,
but their effect is secondary at best.  International financial markets drive foreign exchange rates.3
What drives international finance are the forecasts of market participants, primarily
currency dealers and fund managers.  When they believe that the value of the yen or yen
denominated assets will increase, they purchase them.  If sufficient numbers of their colleagues
agree and follow suit, an appreciation does, indeed, follow.  The question is what made them
decide to take such a stance in the first place; the answer is to be found in the mental model they
employ.
Everyone uses a mental model.  Without it, we could not interact with the world around
us.  It defines for us what external stimuli warrant our attention, what characteristics they have,
what they might cause to occur next (or what caused them), and what consequences our actions
may have.  Currency market participants’ version of a mental model can be distilled from a
number of sources, including surveys, empirical studies, and psychological investigations.  Before
sifting through the literature, however, let us first make some very basic assumptions about
agents’ understanding of the structure of the market.  First, it is safe to say that they understand
that, outside of official intervention, there are only three reasons to buy foreign currency:
import/export (or trade), direct foreign investment, and portfolio foreign investment.  Thus,
events that may have an impact on one of these three processes will be viewed as having the
potential to move exchange rates (and others will not).  There is also little doubt that they know
that they and their colleagues make money not by waiting for those events to work their way
through various economic channels to affect the exchange rate, but by acting in anticipation of
those effects.  Thus, when new information suggests, for example, that direct investment flows
may be altered, the impact is both immediate and not on direct investment, but in the financial
capital market as agents adjust their portfolios to position themselves to take advantage of the4
forecast movement.  In other words, the initial impact of information relating to any of the three
reasons for purchasing foreign exchange is on portfolio foreign investment.  The reaction time is
known to be very fast and it is for this reason that agents care much less about the accuracy of
news than in getting it before their colleagues (Oberlechner and Hocking 2004: 418)!  It does not
have to be true for the financial market to react to it, and if there was a reaction then money was
made and lost–better to not be in the latter group.
Figure 1 illustrates these basic principles regarding the mental model.  At the center is the
object of every agent’s efforts, the currency forecast, measured as dollars per unit of foreign
exchange (FX).  Consistent with the above discussion, the determinants of that forecast are (X-
M)
e
us (expected net U.S. exports), net DFI
e
us (expected net direct foreign investment into the US),
and net PFI
e
us (expected net portfolio foreign investment into the US).  The negative signs on the
links between these variables and the forecast reflect the fact that agents assume that a rise in any
one of them creates a net demand for dollars, indicating a dollar appreciation (i.e., a fall in $/FX).
The “e” superscript on these processes reflects the fact that agents are making their foreign
exchange forecast based on what they expect to occur in trade, DFI, and PFI. Realized levels of
(X-M), DFI, and PFI are obviously important foci for their expectational counterparts, but are
insufficient to serve as the sole inputs into a forecast (particularly when most realized values will
not be known one month or more after the event).5
The $/FX forecast itself then drives actual (as opposed to expected) net portfolio foreign
investment flows into the U.S. (shown as net PFIus).  The link is shown as negative because as
agents upwardly revise their $/FX forecast this means they expect the dollar to be worth less in
the future.  This causes the reverse (i.e., a fall) in net portfolio foreign investment into the U.S. 
The net PFIus then shows a negative link to the actual $/FX exchange rate since a rise in net
inflows would cause a dollar appreciation (a fall in $/FX).  Thus, any forecast change in $/FX
becomes realized as financial capital flows adjust.
The next question is what market participants believe affects the three processes shown on
the left in Figure 1.  Unfortunately, market participants’ forecasts appear to go through fads and
fashions.  What may be considered an important factor one month may be ignored the next.  To
account for this fact, only the most consistently referenced base factors impacting on the
processes shown in Figure 1 will be listed explicitly. Studies have shown these to be interest rates,
macroeconomic growth and stability (as represented variously by unemployment, GDP, durable
goods orders, and retail sales), inflation, trade flows, and the money supply (see for example
Figure 1: Mental Model: Processes (trade, direct
foreign investment, and portfolio foreign
investment).6
Cheung and Chinn 2000; Cheung, Chinn, and Marsh 2004; Ederington and Lee 1993).   As money
supply has become much less popular over the past five to ten years and since, at any rate, it was
really being used as an input into the inflation and interest rate forecasts, it will not enter into the
discussion at this stage.  Also, trade flows already appear as a process.  This leaves us with three
base factors: relative prices/inflation, interest rates, and macro growth and stability.  In addition, it
appears that currencies are viewed as being more or less useful in retiring debt or acquiring
foreign goods, services, and assets.  This is shown as “liquidity” and will comprise a fourth base
factor.
These additions are shown in Figure 2, with (Pus-Pfx)
e representing expected prices or
inflation (US minus foreign), (yus-yfx)
e expected macroeconomic growth and stability (US minus
foreign), (rus-rfx)
e expected relative interest rates (US minus foreign), and “$ liquidity” expected
dollar liquidity relative to alternatives.  In terms of the links between the base factors and
processes, anecdotal evidence combined with knowledge derived from empirical studies suggests
the patterns shown (Akiba 2004; Harvey 2004, 2002, 1998-99, and 1993b; Harvey and Quinn
1997; and Mussa 2007-8, 2004, and 2002).  They are also consistent with economic explanations
of the interrelationships.  Starting with the expectation of relative prices (or relative rates of
inflation), a rise would impact negatively on agents’ forecast of net U.S. exports as imports would
become cheaper and exports more expensive.  A rise in expected relative prices is also a negative
force with respect to net DFI
e
us, as resource-seeking direct foreign investment is discouraged by
increasing input costs. Changes in the prices of goods and services have no direct impact on2That said, it has been very common, particularly since the early 1980s, for agents to
interpret rising inflation as an indicator of future central-bank initiated increases in the rate of
interest.  In that event, however, this would impact the forecast via “indicators” (to be introduced
shortly) and subsequently through relative interest rates.
7
portfolio investment and so no link between them is shown.
2
Expectations of rising (relative) macro growth and stability would cause agents to forecast
a fall in net exports (as rising incomes cause an increase in U.S. imports), a rise in net DFI
e
us (as
market-seeking direct foreign investment increases), and a rise in net PFI
e
us. The last will result
because a) asset issuers will be seen as more likely to earn profits in an environment of macro
growth and stability; b) at least part of the rising domestic incomes may be diverted into the asset
market, driving up prices; and c) government-issued securities increase in value because as the tax
base grows since this diminishes the likelihood of default.
The base factor that attracts agents’ attention most consistently is relative interest rates. 
While these have no direct connection to net exports or direct foreign investment, a rise in (rus-rfx)
e
(ceteris paribus) makes interest-bearing assets and deposits more attractive to investors and leads
Figure 2: Mental Model: Processes and Base Factors.8
to portfolio capital inflows (net PFI
e
us). Several of the sustained post-Bretton Woods foreign
exchange swings have had at their core an existing or expected interest-rate differential in favor of
the appreciating currency.
Last, the relative ease with which agents believe that currency can be used to retire debt or
purchase goods, services, and other assets (i.e., its liquidity) leads to a favorable adjustment in
portfolio composition (if, for example, the dollar is viewed as more liquid then this would be
reflected by a rise in PFI
e
us).  This effect is most obvious when there is a safe-haven rush to the
dollar in international markets or when nations prefer one currency to another as reserve.
Listing these four base factors and tying them into the three processes offers a basic
overview of the mental model, but the fads and fashions mentioned earlier are too important to
omit.  As their very nature precludes specifying a list of the relevant variables, they are captured
by the set of determinants labeled as “Indicators” on Figure 3.  These are any of the evolving set
of determinants thought to reflect, affect, or predict the base factors and sometimes the processes
themselves.  These can include central bankers’ speeches, political news, unique economic events,
and so on–anything that agents believe (however fleetingly) has an impact on the base factors or
processes.
Figure 3 also includes the effect of technical analysis.  It is now well accepted that trading
rules are widely used, despite objections from Neoclassical economics that it represents irrational
behavior (Taylor and Allen 1992).  Thus, a key part of agents’ mental model is their belief that
using past time series to forecast future trends is an indispensable part of their arsenal, particularly
over the short run.  Since the majority of rules are some variety of moving average, as the dollar
appreciates (shown by a fall in $/FX) this will tend to generate a “buy dollar” signal (rise in9
“technical analysis buy $ signals”).  Agents acting on this information will adjust their portfolios
accordingly (a rise in PFI
e
us), leading to an actual appreciation in the dollar.  Note that “technical
analysis buy $ signals” forms part of a positive feedback loop.
Another component to be added to the mental model is a function of the fact that agents
operate with at least two time horizons in mind, both the short term represented by the $/FX
Forecast and the medium-term expectations shown in Figure 4 (see especially Schulmeister 1987
and 1988; see also Gehrig and Menkhoff 2005; Cheung, Chinn, and Marsh 2004; Cheung and
Chinn 2000; and Menkhoff 2001).  Though the latter may take a particular value, it is best
understood as being one of three states: bullish, bearish, or neutral with respect to a currency.  In
this way, it acts as a lens through which agents view and interpret information fed into the mental
model.  If the medium-term expectational bias were bullish on the dollar, for example, the effect is
to magnify pro dollar inputs that appear on the mental model and to downplay or even ignore anti
dollar news and events.  Analogously, if the medium-term bias bearish were on the dollar, the
Figure 3: Mental Model: Processes, Base Factors, Indicators, and Technical Analysis.10
impact of pro dollar factors on the mental model are diminished and anti ones are reinforced. 
Neutral means no particular bias is held.
The medium-term expectational bias shown on Figure 4 is an integral part of the mental
model, but no physical connections with the rest of the diagram are shown since the specific
manner in which it affects the variables would be difficult to model.  It should be easy enough to
bear in mind, however, that if “down-arrow $/FX” (a pro-dollar bias) is entered into the blank
after “Medium-Term Expectation” that the impact of indicators, base factors, and processes that
would lead to a rise in the dollar should be magnified while the effect of others should be
diminished.   In terms of its determinants, they are a moving average of what determines the $/FX
Forecast (Harvey 1993b).  One could add some sort of link from $/FX Forecast to Medium-Term
Expectations to make this more explicit, but I opted not to further complicate the diagram.  Note
that though these are called “Medium-Term” Expectations, the implication here is not that they
Figure 4: Mental Model: Processes, Base Factors, Indicators, Technical
Analysis, and Medium-Term Expectations.11
have a greater impact over longer time horizons.  Everything that happens does so in the short
run.  Rather, the primary role of Medium-Term Expectations is to modify how agents interpret
information in the present.
The last factor to consider is confidence (already included on Figure 4).  This vital
component is often overlooked in discussions of expectations.  Clearly, even if the consensus
forecast is that the euro will, for example, appreciate, whether it does so and by how much is
strongly affected by agents’ collective confidence in that forecast.  A total lack of confidence, for
example, would mean that the expectation of appreciation would have no effect on spot prices
whatsoever.  On the other hand, complete confidence would mean that any gap between the
current rate of exchange and the aggregate expectation would be rapidly and totally closed.  With
respect to the level that generally prevails in asset markets, a curious juxtaposition of forces
exists.  On the one hand, Keynes tells us that it is typically quite low as agents’ are faced with the
fundamentally uncertain nature of the economy (Keynes 1964: 154).  On the other, market
participants are, due to animal spirits, prone to action rather than inaction and they are desirous of
quick results (Keynes 1964: 157 and 161).  Hence, periods of intense and eager trading may drive
a currency price in one direction only to be suddenly stopped and reversed because forecasts held
with low confidence are “...liable to change violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation of
opinion” (Keynes 1964: 154).  This cannot be shown directly on the model but placing a reference
to it (i.e., “forecast confidence”) reminds us to take its impact into account.12
The Mental Model: In Operation
This completes the mental model.  Though one more factor will be added momentarily,
strictly speaking it is not part of agents’ conceptualization of the world with which they interact. 
The latter is shown in its entirety in Figure 4.  The mental model demonstrates that currency
market participants spend intense hours every day in search of information that may allow them to
generate the $/FX Forecast.  They understand perfectly well what is shown on Figure 4, that is,
that the aggregate market forecast drives financial capital flows and thereby sets the actual
exchange rate.  This means that they are terribly concerned with discovering what their colleagues
think will happen (regardless of whether or not it is true) and so a vital part of the forecasting
process is an attempt to gauge market attitudes.  How they do so and what information they seek
(as defined by the mental model) are important questions to be answered.
According to Oberlechner and Hocking, foreign currency dealers’ top source of
information in this endeavor are the wire services (followed by personal contacts and analysts;
Oberlechner and Hocking 2004: 412).  Their research further indicates that the financial
journalists authoring those reports rely primarily on dealers in gathering their data, thus creating a
feedback loop in the creation of the information that moves currency prices (Oberlechner and
Hocking 2004: 412)!   The consequence has been that “financial markets may be less about the
actuality of economic facts than about how information is perceived and interpreted by market
participants” (Oberlechner and Hocking 2004: 422).  This does not mean that the market is simply
reacting to sun spots.  Indeed, it is generally the case that there is some economic event
underlying the trends that emerge–but, not always, and nor is the response necessarily the same
every time or well measured.  The fact that agents prefer information that “Is available to me13
before it is to others” and “Will influence market participants” over that which “Is reported by a
reliable source” or “Seems accurate to me” creates a situation in which rumors take on an air of
truth as they cycle through the loop (Oberlechner and Hocking 2004: 415 and 421).  Such rumors
must have some connection to the mental model and there may be some correction after false
information is exposed, but a) given the complexity of the international financial market, there is
no guarantee that the latter will occur and b) if currency prices are moved by rumor, then other
economic variables have already been forced to adjust.  We cannot go back in time and have the
Walrasian auctioneer recontract everything.
In terms of where in the mental model diagram new data enter, it varies.  Whenever
possible, agents would love to be able to discover inputs as close to $/FX Forecast as possible so
that less interpretation is necessary.  In addition, agents prefer finding data that they assume will
impact more directly on portfolio capital flows since these are the dominant force in currency
markets.  Ceteris paribus, extra weight can be expected to be placed on such data.  As suggested
above, in practice it is interest rate information that moves the market most consistently.
In thinking about how agents use the mental model, it is important to ask how they
understand the operation of the market in general.  Do they view it as mechanistic, random,
manipulable?  Oberlechner, Slunecko, and Kronberger asked this very question and sought to
answer it by undertaking a series of interviews with foreign exchange market participants.  They
then analyzed the interviews to determine what metaphor or metaphors agents used to understand
currency price movements.  They argue first that foreign exchange is a “human construction
which emerges from the shared understandings of market participants” (Oberlechner, Slunecko,
and Kronberger 2004: 152).  Also consistent with the analysis here, they believe that the14
predominant metaphor may shift over time (Oberlechner, Slunecko, and Kronberger 2004: 153-
4).  They further distinguished between metaphors agents volunteered when queried (explicit
metaphors) and those determined by studying the interviews (implicit metaphors).  When asked
directly, agents’ most common responses were that they viewed the market as a bazaar or sports;
implicitly, however, it was evident that interviewees saw foreign exchange as a living being or an
ocean  (Oberlechner, Slunecko, and Kronberger 2004: 151).   It is important to note here that 
“...explicit metaphors may, at least partly, be indicative of how market participants think they
should talk about the market,” while the implicit may represent, “the participants’ understanding
in practice.”  Thus, while the bazaar or sports may be what they say, in fact, it appears that agents
view the currency market as (taking the living being metaphor) “an animated organism following
its own rhythm,” something that reacts “emotionally” and “is not always intelligible,” dependent
more on “mood” than “fixed rules”  (Oberlechner, Slunecko, and Kronberger 2004: 143-4).  In
addition, it is (taking the ocean metaphor) marked by “flows, levels, currents, streams, and
channels,” “less predictable and less deterministic than as a machine,” and capable, in the normal
course of events, of “quiet and of dramatic times”  (Oberlechner, Slunecko, and Kronberger 2004:
145-6).  In thinking in terms of both implicit metaphors, it seems that market participants believe
that the force of the individual is puny.  It also appeared to be the sense of the interviewees that
while we can struggle to understand the ways of the market–indeed, those interviewed must do so
if they are to perform their job–a firm grasp of the workings of a phenomenon so vast, moody,
and complex will surely elude us.  We must muddle through as best we can.
As suggested above, one last process will be added to the mental model even though it is
not, strictly speaking, part of agents’ conceptualization.  However, it’s role is so central to the3What makes all this especially interesting is that these individuals are the market, yet they
are expressing confusion over how the market is operating.  Note how well this fits Oberlechner,
Slunecko, and Kronberger’s argument regarding dealers’ reliance on the living being and ocean
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determination of exchange rates that, if the rest of this paper is to be an analysis of actual currency
movements, it must be considered.  This is the bandwagon effect, or the tendency of market
participants to copy one another’s behavior.  The most visible manifestation of this phenomenon is
when agents buy an appreciating currency simply because it is appreciating (or sell one simply
because it is depreciating).  I have argued elsewhere that this phenomenon is a result of a variety
of psychological factors (Harvey 1998, 2006, and 2008).  Others, too, have found considerable
support for the existence of herd behavior (see for example Beine, Benassy-Quere, and Colas
2003, Oberlechner and Hocking 2004, Oberlechner and Osler 2008).  In the context of the mental
model diagram, bandwagon effects make themselves felt through purchases of financial assets.  As
a currency appreciates, so agents are induced to “jump on the bandwagon” by altering their
portfolios to include more of those denominated in that currency.  This, of course, contributes to
the currency appreciation and attracts even more bandwagon jumpers (as is shown in the positive-
feedback loop: bandwagon purchases of US assets-net PFIus-$/FX).  This process can pull the
current spot price of the currency well out of line with what the mental model would otherwise
have justified (particularly if it works in tandem with medium-term expectations).  As this process
continues, so agents’ confidence may decrease, further diminishing the direct impact of the mental
model.  During such episodes, one may find financial reporters quoting dealers as being confused
by the market and unable to understand how the price is continuing in the given direction (yet
dealers continue to contribute to the bandwagon for fear of missing the boat).  It is furthermore
not uncommon for market participants to openly suspect the operation of bandwagon effects.
3  Ifmetaphors (Oberlechner, Slunecko, and Kronberger 2004).
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the bandwagon creates a separation between the actual spot price and the one justified by the
mental model continues, then it requires an increasingly mundane event to start a sudden and
potentially catastrophic run in the opposite direction.
This completes the theory portion of the paper.  To summarize, primary driver in the
foreign exchange market is the demand for currency arising from the desire to purchase foreign
financial assets.  In determining which assets they want in their portfolio, agents continually
forecast future currency price movements, which really means trying to decide what their
colleagues are thinking.  Assets denominated in currencies expected to appreciate are preferred to
those denominated in currencies expected to depreciate.
Behind that all-important forecast is the mental model, or agents conceptualization of the
operation of the foreign currency market.  While it exists only in their minds, it is nevertheless a
social phenomenon as it is created and evolves when market participants interact professionally
and socially with their colleagues, publish and read scholarly and professional opinions, train new
dealers and are trained, et cetera.  Because they understand currency markets as a living organism
and an ocean, they expect that even carefully constructed forecasts will be frequently disappointed
as emotions and moods impact prices.  Their generally low level of confidence creates the
volatility about which Keynes warned (Keynes 1964: 154).
Collapse of the Dollar: 2001-2008
The following examination (drawn from the very detailed accounts in the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York’s “Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations” ) of the17
dollar-euro market since 2001 will, consistent with the theory outlined above, find evidence of
bandwagon effects, pre-existing biases emerging from medium-term expectations, an almost
exclusive focus on variables associated with portfolio investment (particularly interest rates), rapid
and sometimes very large reevaluations of future price movements, and (as a consequence of the
last) large swings in the actual rates at which foreign exchange trades.  For purposes of analysis
the period of dollar depreciation can be divided into four segments: Transition (July 2001 through
March 2002–this is broken into two parts in terms of the mental model schematic), Collapse I
(April 2002 through December 2004), Recovery (January 2005 through December 2005), and
Collapse II (January 2006 through March 2008).  The discussion will be organized accordingly. 
The whole period is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Stages of Dollar Collapse (data from www.economagic.com).4The euro’s low was reached in October of 2000 when it hit $0.827; but, after recovering
somewhat through the end of that year it started on another downward vector in 2001 and fell to
$0.837 in early July.
18
Transition: July 2001 through March 2002
The euro was introduced on January 1, 1999 at a price of $1.1812.  It very quickly
proceeded to lose value to the dollar and continued to do so until mid 2001.
4 Although this was
due primarily to interest rate differentials, the dollar’s LIBOR advantage had actually peaked in
December 1999 and turned negative during second quarter of 2001.  On top of this, US economic
indicator releases tended to be negative throughout the first half of the year.  Still, the dollar
continued to climb, apparently on the strength of its momentum (i.e., bandwagons and medium-
term expectations) and agents’ feeling that growth in Europe would be even weaker–how much
of the latter was a function of the medium-term bias is difficulty to say.  Factors were
accumulating, however, that were leading agents (through their mental model) to reevaluate the
dollar’s strength.
Indeed, by July, poor macro data and falling dollar interest rates (shown on Figure 6 by
the downward arrows on (yus - yfx)
e and (rus - rfx)
e) had become central in agents’ mental model. 
Because each of these would cause market participants to move away from dollar assets, agents
believed that there would be a net outflow of financial capital from the US (down-arrow net PFI
e
us)
and, as a consequence, a dollar depreciation (up-arrow $/FX Forecast).  For that reason, they sold
dollar assets, which caused the forecast capital outflows (down-arrow net PFIus) and the dollar
depreciation (up-arrow $/FX).  There was no strong medium-term expectation in favor of or
against the dollar at this point (given that it was a period of transition) and bandwagon forces did5Technical analysis will not be seen to have been important throughout the period covered
but was included in the theory section of this paper for completeness.  Forecast confidence plays a
role, but because it is rather indirect it is not shown.
19
not appear to play a significant role.
5  All of this is illustrated in Figure 6, where factors that did
not play a significant role are omitted so that the main currents are more visible (this convention is
followed throughout the analysis).
But, agents had yet to establish a firm opinion of the dollar and there was, in fact, a quick
recovery as agents came to believe that, even if there was a slowdown, it would be less severe in
the US (up-arrow (yus - yfx)
e on Figure 7).  Furthermore, their belief was so strong that a
continually shrinking $-euro interest rate spread was completely ignored because they expected
US advantage in growth was seen as an indicator of a future reversal of that trend.  This is shown
on Figure 7.
Figure 6: Mental model, first half of Transition (July-September 2001).20
Collapse I (April 2002 through December 2004)
This turned out to be short-lived, however, as medium-term expectations soon turned
anti-dollar.  As a consequence, when, in the second quarter of 2002, the US equity market
declined, interest rates fell, growth rates were downwardly revised, and the equity market
suffered, the dollar went into a steep slide.  Of the twenty-two trading days in April, the dollar fell
on fifteen of them as the euro went from $0.8806 to $0.9002.  The bad news continued through
the end of the year as dollar interest rates hit historic lows, geopolitical tensions in Iraq and Korea
and rising oil prices were thought to hurt the US more than others, economic indicators continued
to paint a bleak picture, and the news of accounting irregularities in US industries came to light. 
By December 31, the euro had come to rest at $1.0485–a fall of sixteen percent just since April 1.
2003 was much of the same, with the euro rising from $1.0361 on January 1 to $1.2597
Figure 7: Mental Model, second half of Transition (October 2001-March
2002).21
on December 31 (almost eighteen percent).  The issues were similar: Iraq, oil prices, low interest
rates, and slow growth.  In addition, the market became concerned with the US trade deficit (all
indicated on Figure 8).  2004 was slightly more mixed, but still saw the dollar fall by roughly
seven percent (actually, the first half of the year witnessed a slight dollar recovery as agents began
to believe that the US interest rates might recover–hence the combination of up and down arrows
on (rus - rfx)
e in Figure 8; in the end, the net impact was an expectation of a fall in the dollar
interest rate differential).  By the end of the year, negative medium-term expectations for the
dollar led good news to be ignored (such as rising interest rates and improving economic
indicators) and bad news to move the dollar disproportionately.  It may also be that bandwagon
effects were playing a role in holding the dollar down as well, though it is not entirely clear (hence
the question mark after “bandwagon purchases of US assets”).
Figure 8: Mental Model, Collapse I (April 2002-December 2004).22
Recovery (January 2005 through December 2005)
Apparently, the good news regarding the dollar was not being totally ignored, however, as
a shift in medium-term expectations did eventually take place and the dollar recovered.  Most of
the increase over the year took place in the first half when, despite attention being refocused on
the large US trade deficit (note that it is marked “ignored” on Figure 9), the pro-dollar bias meant
that positive developments regarding US economic growth and interest rates dominated.  For the
remainder the year, the dollar rose slightly despite market participants’ fears that countries may
move away from the dollar as reserve currency and concerns regarding oil prices and hurricane
Katrina (note these labeled as “net minor impacts” on Figure 9).  Bandwagon effects, too, may
have supported the dollar.
Figure 9: Mental model, Recovery (January 2005-December 2005).23
Collapse II (January 2006 through March 2008)
Negative dollar news finally tipped the scales as medium-term expectations swung the
other way and agents began to expect a close in the dollar’s interest-rate advantage.  Their
predictions soon came true, adding to a relatively moderate decline in the first quarter of 2006.  In
April, new fuel was added to fire when G7 statements calling exchange-rate flexibility in emerging
markets a good thing was taken as tacit approval of a dollar fall (something officials were quick to
deny, but to no effect).  The remainder of 2006 was generally bad for the dollar as the interest-
rate spread continued to close and there was some speculation that central banks were shifting
reserves away from the dollar.
2007 started slightly better but soon slipped into the same pattern as the interest-rate
differential closed throughout the year, the subprime concerns hit the headlines, credit markets
tightened, and US consumer confidence fell (see Figure 10).  This continued through first quarter
of 2008 when there was very steep decline as negative data accumulated, including financial
sector losses.  As agents’ confidence in their ability to forecast the volatile market decreased, so
they retreated from speculative positions and the dollar finally stabilized–at almost half of its value
from eight years earlier.  The collapse had finally come to an end.24
Lessons
A number of important lessons emerge from this short history of the dollar as seen
through the mental model.  First, it must be recognized that, even though we have perhaps been
jaded by witnessing daily financial-market volatility,  the currency price swings during this period
were extremely large and clearly excessive.  Consider the fact that during the oil crises of the
1970s and 1980s, US annual inflation, considered to be dangerously high at the time, never
reached fourteen percent.  By contrast, Table One shows that once the transition period was over,
the dollar-euro shifts were never less than that (albeit over longer periods during the two
collapses) and for most of six years were, in fact, much higher.  These magnitudes would never
have been tolerated had this been consumer price inflation, and yet for certain sectors in the
effected economies the impact was the same.  Even worse, there was no fundamental reason (like
an OPEC oil embargo) for this to have happened.  It was absolutely avoidable and suggests that
Figure 10: Mental Model, Collapse II (January 2006-March 2008).25
allowing international financial investors free reign in determining currency values (via the mental
model) is not costless and certainly cannot be defended on efficiency grounds.
TABLE 1: Summary dollar movements from July 2001.
Period $-euro movement
Transition (July 2001-March 2002) 3% dollar depreciation
Collapse I (April 2002-December 2004) 35% dollar depreciation
Recovery (January 2005-December 2005) 14% dollar appreciation
Collapse II (January 2006-March 2008) 24% dollar depreciation
Second, this pattern of momentous swings in one direction offset by equally momentous
ones in the other is systemic and a function of the fact that currency prices are “mis-determined”
because of their short-term orientation (Harvey 2008: 124).  The ultimate goal of economic
activity is output and employment.  If exchange rates are to play a positive role in this process
then they should reflect the relative attractiveness of goods and services and real investment
across nations.  Since this can be expected to change only gradually, we should witness slow
adjustments in exchange rates.   By contrast, what we have, in short order, seen a 35% decline in
the dollar followed by a 14% rise and then another 24% fall.  There is simply no reasonable
justification for this.  It occurred because exchange rates follow the very short and volatile time
horizon of financial markets rather than that for goods and services.
Third, as suggested by dealers’ implicit metaphor, the currency market is more akin to an
organism than a mechanism.  The causal processes are identifiable but constantly changing.  This
is in no small part because of the market participants’ lack of confidence in their forecasts, which
is what ultimately drives the market.  With their expectations they are trying to hit a moving,26
evolving, uncertain target, their information source turns out ultimately to be themselves and their
colleagues, and social pressures exist to buy and sell (via bandwagons) currencies even when their
tentative expectations suggest that they should do otherwise.   Little wonder we see so much
variation in Figures 6 through 10, variation that forces us to use a tool of analysis like the mental
model to understand the workings of the foreign exchange market.
Last, even though the specifics of the mental model may vary over time (sometimes
rapidly), there are some basic facts that remain the same.  First, economic variables and world
events will almost invariably be interpreted in terms of how they may affect financial markets,
most often via interest rates. In addition, agents will form biases for an against currencies and this
will strongly impact of the interpretation of inputs (to the point that some otherwise important
pieces of information may be totally ignored).  Bandwagons will occur and these may exacerbate
the typical low confidence levels in the market by drawing prices away from what agents might
otherwise have seen as reasonable (while agents, nevertheless, continue to contribute to the
bandwagon, fearful of missing the boat).  Biases and bandwagons will cause currency runs to
contiue for months after cooler heads would have suggested otherwise.  And there will be swings
well out of proportion to any fundamental factors as agents act both in ignorance but with animal
spirits and a desire for quick money.  These are not the only reasons for the volatility we witness,
but they contribute (for more see Harvey 2008: 51-52).
Conclusions
The mental model offers a specific explanation of processes and consequences that will
not surprise the readers of this journal.  It is yet another nail in what should be the coffin of the27
fetish of liquidity.  Free flow of financial capital across national borders is what allows the short of
numbers shown in Table 1 and because there is no justification for it, step one in any reformation
of the international monetary system must be a serious attempt to limit international capital flows
(see Harvey 2008 chapter seven for more specific recommendations).  Time will tell whether or
not the current (as of November 2008) global financial crisis will spur world leaders, including the
newly elected President of the United States, to finally take such measures.28
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